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REVIEW ESSAY
Bringing Foucault into Law and Law
into Foucault
Hugh Baxter*
FOUCAULT AND LAW:

TowARDS

By
148 pp.

A SOCIOLOGY OF LAW AS GOVERNANCE.

Alan Huntt and Gary Wickham.1
$18.95.

London: Pluto Press.

1994.

The announcedpurpose of Alan Hunt and Gary Wickham 's book Foucault
and Law, is "to demonstrate the pertinence of [Michel] Foucaultfor contemporary issues in legal studies." In this review essay, Hugh Baxter acknowledges the important contributions Hunt and Wickham have made, both in
introducing basic Foucaultianconcepts to a legal academic audience, and in
identifying the defects in Foucault's explicit discussions of law. Yet, Baxter
contends, the authors turn too quickly from Foucault'swork toward their own
new researchproject, the "sociology of law as governance." Rather than constructing a new subdiscipline of the sociology of law, Baxter argues, the authors might have considered more directly how Foucault's work could
illuminate issues in contemporary legal studies. Through a critical examination of some exemplary appropriationsof Foucault,Baxter suggests the possibilities and limits of Foucault'susefulness for legal scholarship.
Alan Hunt and Gary Wickham direct their book, Foucaultand Law, toward
two absences. The first is the relative lack of attention legal scholars have
given Michel Foucault's work, despite its continuing influence in the humanities some twelve years after his death.' The second absence, Hunt and Wickham suggest, is in Foucault's work itself, and it helps explain Foucault's
indifferent reception in the legal academy. While "[h]e has a great deal to say
about law and even more that has legal relevance," the authors observe, "Fou* Associate Professor of Law, Boston University. A.B., Stanford University, 1980; Ph.D., Yale
University, 1985; J.D., Stanford University, 1990. Thanks to Jane Goldman, Pnina Lahav, Molly
McUsic, Reva Siegel, Katharine Silbaugh, Manuel Utset, and especially Marina Leslie.

t Professor in Law and Sociology, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada.
t Lecturer in Sociology, Murdoch University, Perth, Australia.
1. P. vii.
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cault does not have a theory of law." 2 Indeed, as Hunt and Wickham argue,
3
Foucault "tends to expel law from any major role" in modem society.
The absence of a Foucaultian theory of law presents the central problem of
Hunt and Wickham's book: If Foucault's work offers no plausible account of
law, why should legal scholars take him seriously? If we seek to bring Foucault into law, must we not first bring law into Foucault?
Hunt and Wickham declare from the outset that ordinary techniques of interpretation cannot generate a Foucaultian theory of law.4 Accordingly, they
draw on Foucault's work more selectively and indirectly. After introducing the
concepts and themes of Foucault's work to an audience trained in law but innocent of Foucault, 5 and identifying the "expulsion of law" from his work, 6 the
authors use Foucault's writings only as a point of departure for "a new and
fruitful approach to the exploration of legal phenomena."'7 Hunt and Wickham
entitle this new approach "the sociology of law as governance" s and classify it
as a "subdiscipline" of the sociology of law. 9 The "law as governance" approach borrows extensively from the classical sociological tradition, particularly from Durkheim and Weber. 10 Thus, in Hunt and Wickham's words: "the
name Foucault does not signal an intellectual revolution," but instead "an opportunity to return to some nineteenth- and early twentieth-century sociological
endeavors." 11
The authors' diagnosis of Foucault's "expulsion of law" is an important
accomplishment. They also deserve credit for seeing that Foucault's failure to
develop an adequate theory of law presents a problem for, but does not necessarily preclude, his appropriation by contemporary legal scholars. The authors'
solution to this problem-their outline of the "law as governance" approachseems to me far less satisfactory. Considered on its own terms, the governance
approach has significant weaknesses. More important, the authors' presentation of their new theory deflects our attention from the book's central question:
Given the inadequacy of Foucault's theory of law, how can Foucault's work
nevertheless be useful to legal academics? At the end of this review, I suggest
a different strategy for answering this question. Rather than develop a new
theory of law, the authors might have explored exemplary appropriations of
2. P. viii.
3. P. 22.
4. "We stress that the neglect of Foucault cannot be made good by a mere packaging of his direct
comments on matters legal.... [N]o amount of stitching together of this material can deliver 'Foucault's theory of law.' ... Consequently, we do not set out to construct a 'Foucaultian theory of law.'"

P. viii.
5. Pp. 3-36.
6. P. 56 (describing Foucault's treatment of law as "the expulsion of law from modemity"); see
also pp. 55-71 (describing and criticizing Foucault's expulsion of law).

7. P. viii.
8. Pp. 77-78, 99-102.
9. Pp. 121-22.

10. See pp. 78, 92-97, 112-20 (discussing Durkheim); pp. 76, 99-100, 116 (discussing Weber). In
proposing a new direction for the sociology of law, Hunt and Wickham also acknowledge the influence
of "Machiavellian political theory" and incorporate "traces of ethnomethodological sociology and Parsonian sociology." P. 78.
11. P. 132.
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Foucault in existing legal scholarship, or considered more directly than they do
how Foucault's themes and concepts might be put to work in future legal
scholarship.
I.

FOUCAULT AND THE "ANALYTICS OF POWER"

As Hunt and Wickham observe, Foucault's intellectual career defies "easy
encapsulation."' 2 Foucault's interests and methods changed over time, and his
scattered attempts to describe his own works are notoriously (and perhaps intentionally) inconsistent. 13 Hunt and Wickham sensibly avoid asking whether
the various phases of Foucault's work form a unity. Rather than construct an
intellectual biography of a "real Foucault," Hunt and Wickham acknowledge14
"that there are many 'Foucaults' who coexist and interact with one another."'
Of these many Foucaults, the one Hunt and Wickham discuss in the most
detail is the one best known to American readers: the Foucault of 1975 to 1977
andPunish,15 The History
who developed an "analytics of power" in Discipline
of Sexuality, Volume ,16 and Power/Knowledge. 17 In these works, the authors
argue, "[flaw comes to the fore" and "forms a significant motif."' 8 Nevertheless, they conclude, Foucault ultimately "expel[s] law from any significant
role" in his account of modem power. 19
In this section, I outline the central themes and concepts of Foucault's analytics of power. This account will serve as background for my discussion, in
part II, of Foucault's "expulsion of law."2 0
12. P. 3.
13. Compare, eg., MICHEL FOUCAULT, Truth and Power,reprinted in PowEt/KNowLEDGE: SELEcTED INTERVIEWS AND OTHER WRITINGS 1972-1977, at 109, 115 (Colin Gordon ed., Colin Gordon,
Leo Marshall, John Mepham, & Kate Soper trans., 1980) ("[W]hat else it was that I was talking about,
in Madness and Civilisation or The Birth of the Clinic, but power?") with MicHEL FOUCAULT, Critical
Theory/Intellectual History, in POLmCS, Pnm.osoPHv, CUsLTtu: INTERVIEWS AND OTHmR WRITINGS,
1977-1984 at 39 (Lawrence D. Kritzman ed., Alan Sheridan trans., 1988) ("[Plower, as an autonomous
question, does not interest me.... I am not developing a theory of power. I am working on the history
...of the way reflexivity of self upon self is established, and the discourse of truth that is linked to it.')
and Michel Foucault, On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress, in HuBERT L.
tics 229,
DxR, Fus & PAUL RABINOW, MICHEL FOUCAULT: BEYOND STucuRAr.isM AND HERmENEU
237 (2d ed. 1983) (distinguishing among truth, power, and ethics, and stating that "[t]he truth axis was
studied in The Birth ofthe Clinic," while Madness and Civilization investigated all these axes, albeit in a
somewhat confused fashion) and Michel Foucault, The Subject and Power, in DREYFus & RABINOW,
supra, at 208, 209 ("[I]t is not power, but the subject, which is the general theme of my research.").
14. P.3.
15. MICHEL FOUcAULT, Discin'uN AND PUsH: TmE BIrTH OF T=E PRISON (Alan Sheridan trans.,
Pantheon Books 1977) (1975).
16. Micm. FOuCAULT, I THE HISTORY OF SExuALITY: AN INTRODUCTION (Robert Hurley trans.,
Vintage Books 1990) (1976).
17. FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE, supranote 13. Hunt and Wickham rely heavily on the 19751977 essays in id. at 78-133.
18. P. 39.

19. P. 34.
20. My overview of Foucault is, I think, consistent with the authors' account, although not identical in detail or order of presentation.
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The JuridicalModel of Power/Law/Sovereignty

Foucault was fond of introducing his ideas as departures from received wisdom. He adopts this strategy in developing his notion of power. While here, as
elsewhere, Foucault's account of the received wisdom seems as much caricature as characterization,21 the account nonetheless proves critically important in
understanding Foucault's view of law.
Foucault signals this connection to law in the name he gives the (ostensibly)
traditional view of power: the "juridico-discursive" 22 or "juridical" notion of
24
power.2 3 In this conception, "deeply rooted in the history of the West,"
power is purely negative and prohibitory, 25 "incapable of doing anything, except to render what it dominates incapable of doing anything either."'2 6 The
form of this "power to say no,"2 7 Foucault says, is the legal command, issued
from the sovereign power to the obedient subject.28 This model portrays power
as homogenous 2or9 isomorphic, identical in its manifestations at every level of
the social order.
Foucault traces the juridical model of negative, commanding power to the
triumph of the great monarchies in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
The monarchical power "presented itself as a referee, a power capable of put'30
ting an end to war, violence and pillage and saying no to [feudal] struggles.
The monarch's sovereign power was the power of law; law provided monarchical power with its "mode of manifestation and the form of its acceptability. '31
Foucault, of course, recognizes that in his own era the European monarchies
exist, if at all, in form alone. Nevertheless, he argues, the form of monarchical
thought-the linkage of power, law, and sovereignty-persists. In Foucault's
words: "[D]espite the difference in epochs and objectives, the representation of
thought and analpower has remained under the spell of monarchy. In political
32
ysis, we still have not cut off the head of the king."
Much of Foucault's work during the mid-1970s was an attempt to create a
new "grid of historical decipherment" 33 that could replace the juridical model
of "power-law" and "power-sovereignty." 3 4 Using this new "grid" of con21. See DaREYus & RABiNow, supra note 13, at 127 (stating that the "repressive hypothesis"
Foucault uses as a foil in The History of Sexuality "is not directly attributed to any particular individual
or school. It is set up as a kind of Nietzschean parody of current received opinion.").
22. 1 FOUCAtLT, THE HISTORY OF SaxuALrry, supra note 16, at 82.
23. 1 id. at 86.
24. 1 id. at 83.
25. 1 id.at 84-85; MIcHEL FoucAuLT, Power and Strategies, reprinted in PovmdImowLana,
supra note 13, at 134, 140.
26. 1 FoucAuLT, THE HisroRY OF SEXUALrry, supra note 16, at 85.
27. 1 id.
28. 1 id. at 83, 85.
29. 1 id. at 84-85.
30. FOucAuLT, Truth and Power, supra note 13, at 121.
31. 1 FoucAuLT, Tam HisToRY oF SExuALrry, supra note 16, at 87.
32. 1 id. at 88-89; see also FOUCAuLT, Truth and Power, supra note 13, at 121.
33. 1 FoucAULT, Tim HISTORY OF SxuAMrrv, supra note 16, at 90-91.

34. 1 id.
at 90.
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cepts-in Foucault's term, a new "analytics of power" 35-Foucault

sought to

trace historically the development of new "mechanisms" or "technologies of
power" that operate outside36 the sphere of sovereignty and are "irreducible to
the representation of law."
B.

The Analytics of Power

Foucault's "analytics of power" challenges the conception of power as a
purely negative or repressive force. 37 For Foucault, power is productive: "it
produces domains of objects and rituals of truth."38 Foucault does not trace
power back to a single point, the point of sovereignty.3 9 Rather, he contends
that power relations are omnipresent and diffused throughout society as "the
immediate effects of the divisions, inequalities, and disequilibriums which oc-

cur" in social relationships. 4° Thus, rather than analyzing power relations from

the perspective of the sovereign, Foucault's "microphysics of power" 4 1 emphasizes "power at its extremities... those points where it becomes capillary...
its more regional and local forms and institutions. '42 These "infinitesimal

mechanisms" of power "each have their own history, their own trajectory, their
own techniques and tactics." 43 Beginning from these dispersed points, one can

conduct an "ascending analysis of power" investigating how local techniques
and tactics of power are linked to "more general powers or economic

interests."44
In displacing the traditional notion of power as sovereign command, Foucault emphasizes that power relations include not just the application of force,
but also resistance. For Foucault, the very existence of power relations "depends on a multiplicity of points of resistance." 45 Resistance, understood as the
"irreducible opposite" in the exercise of power, can take various forms-per35. 1 id. at 82 (internal quotation marks omitted). Foucault generally refused the term "theory" of
power. See, eg., id. ("The aim ...is to move less toward a 'theory' of power than toward an 'analytics'
of power.. . ."); FOUCAULT, CriticalTheory/IntellectualHistory, supra note 13, at 38 ("I in no way
construct a theory of Power."). Foucault insisted on this point to avoid converting "power" into a
substantive entity, "Power," whose properties a "theory" of power would purport to explain. 1 FouCAuLT, THE HISTORY OF SFxuALrrv, supra note 16, at 92-93. Thus, his remark in introducing his
analytic of power: "[o]ne needs to be nominalistic, no doubt: power is not an institution, and not a
structure; neither is it a certain strength we are endowed with; it is the name that one attributes to a
complex strategical situation in a particular society." I id. at 93.
36. 1 FoucAu.T, TmE HISTORY OF SEXUALrIY, supra note 16, at 89, 109.
37. See FOUCAULT, DISCiPLInm AND PUNIsH, supra note 15, at 194 ("We must cease once and for
all to describe the effects of power in negative terms: it *excludes,' it 'represses,' it 'censors,' it 'abstracts,' it 'masks,' it 'conceals.' ").
38. Id
39. 1 FOucAULT, TrE HISToRY OF SExuALrry, supra note 16, at 94 ("Power is exercised from
innumerable points.. .
40. 1 id.
41.

FoucAnJLT, DISCIPLINE AND Putisit, supra note 15, at 26.

42.
43.
44.
45.

MicHEL FOUCAuLT, Two Lectures, reprintedin PowERnKow.EaDE, supranote 13, at 78, 96.
Id. at 99.
Id.; see also 1 FoucAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXuAIrrY, supra note 16, at 94.
1 FoucAuLT, THE HISTORY OF SExuALrrY, supranote 16, at 95 ("Where there is power, there

is resistance . . .).
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haps appearing as active opposition,'46but perhaps instead simply as "target, support, or handle in power relations."
As with power relations in general, Foucault's "microphysics of power"
first investigates resistance at the local level. "[T]here is no single locus of
great Refusal," 47 he maintains, but instead "a plurality of resistances, each of
them a special case." 48 For Foucault, to analyze power relations in a given
society is to map the "network" or "dense web" 49 of forces-the interrelations
among tactics, strategies, and technologies of power and resistance.
Foucault's historical studies set this conceptual framework into motion. In
those works, particularly in Discipline and Punish, Foucault sought to historicize the relation between sovereign, monarchical power, and the specifically
modem forms of power that emerged in the seventeenth century. Foucault calls
these modem forms of power "disciplinary power."50 The opposition between
law-as-sovereign-power, on one hand, and disciplinary power, on the other, is
one of the key themes of Foucault's work on power. It will51also turn out to be
essential to Foucault's "expulsion of law" from modernity.
C. Sovereign Power and DisciplinaryPower
Sovereign, monarchical power, Foucault explains, operated through the periodic extraction of revenue or goods5 2.and through occasional but spectacular
infliction of punishment by which the royal power exacted its revenge 3 and
"display[ed] itself in its murderous splendor."'5 4 Sovereign power is thus negative, extractive, and destructive. Disciplinary power, by contrast, employs surveillance, organization, and training to make its object, primarily the human
body, more useful and productive.55 Disciplinary power is micropower: It
works on the human body" 'retail,' individually," extending "an infinitesimal
46. 1 id.
47. 1 id. at 95-96.
48. 1 id. at 96.
49. 1 id.
50. See FoucAULT, Two Lectures, supra note 42, at 104 ("In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, we have the... invention[] of a new mechanism of power... absolutely incompatible with the
relations of sovereignty.").
51. See text accompanying notes 135-146 infra.
52. 1 FouCAULT, Tim HIsTORY Or SExuArrY, supra note 16, at 136 ("[P]ower was exercised
mainly as a means of deduction (pr6l~vement), a subtraction mechanism, a right to appropriate a portion
of the wealth, a tax of products, goods and services, labor and blood, levied on the subjects. Power in
this instance was essentially a right of seizure: of things, time, bodies, and ultimately life itself .... );
see also FoucAuLT, Two Lectures, supra note 42, at 104.
53. FoucAuLT, DISCPLwE AND PUNisH, supra note 15, at 130 (describing punishment under mo-

narchical power as "a ceremonial of sovereignty" that uses "the ritual marks of vengeance"); id.at 47-54
(examining torture and public executions as political rituals that vindicate the sovereign power by demonstrating the "dissymmetry between the subject who has dared to violate the law and the all-powerful
sovereign who displays his strength").
54. 1 FoucAULT, Tim HIsToRY oF SxuArry, supra note 16, at 144.
55. E.g., FOUCAULT, DiscIPLNm Arm PUNIsH, supra note 15, at 170 ("The chief function of the
disciplinary power is to 'train,' rather than to select and to levy."); FOUCAuLT, Two Lectures,supra note
42, at 104-05.
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power over
the active body."5 6 Disciplinary power produces docile and useful
57
bodies.
While Foucault acknowledges the use of disciplinary methods before the
modem period, he argues that it was only in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries that they became "general formulas of domination."5 8 In Discipline
andPunish, Foucault traces the spread of disciplinary technologies in the military,5 9 schools, 60 workshops and factories, 61 orphanages, 6 2 hospitals, 63 and
prisons. 64 Foucault describes three basic principles of disciplinary technology
that were implemented in these institutions. "Hierarchical observation" involves arranging individuals (often architecturally) in order to ensure their
continuous surveillance. 65 "Normalizing judgment" uses small penalties and
rewards to encourage norm-conforming behavior, such as punctuality and diligence. 66 "The examination" combines both of these techniques and places individuals under "a normalizing gaze, a surveillance that makes it possible to
qualify, to classify, and punish." 67 When performed systematically throughout
a particular population, examinations create documentary records establishing
what is "normal" for the population and arranging individuals according to
those norms. 68 In this way, individuals are constituted as objects of both power
and of disciplinary technology's individualizing form of knowledge. 69 Indeed,
Foucault claims, "[t]he individual is . . . a reality fabricated by this specific
technology of power that I have called 'discipline.' "70
For Foucault, Jeremy Bentham's "Panopticon" provides the exemplary instance of disciplinary technology. 7 1 Bentham's celebrated prison design arranged inmate cells in a ring-shaped building surrounding a central tower. The
cells were to be open to the tower and backlit, rendering the inmates "perfectly
individualized and constantly visible"72 to the guard in the tower. Yet because
the lighting and other architectural contrivances made the guard invisible to the
inmates; they had always to assume they were always under the guard's watchful gaze, without ever knowing whether that was so. 7 3 Thus, unlike the traditional prison design, the Panopticon enlisted the inmates in the operation of
56. FoucAULT, DlsCIpLuw AND PUN.SH, supra note 15, at 136-38.

57. Id. at 138.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 137.
Id. at 171-72,
Id. at 172-73,
Id. at 174-75,
Id at 177-78.
Id. at 185-86,
Id. at 200-02,

188.
175-76, 180-82, 186-87, 210-11.
210.
210, 212.
231-56.

65. Id. at 170-77.
66. Id. at 177-84. "The workshop, the school, the army were subject to a whole micro-penality of
time ....

of activity ....

of behavior ....

of speech ....

of the body. . . , of sexuality." Id. at 178.

67. Id. at 184; see also id. at 184-92.
68. Id. at 189-90. Medical examinations provide a paradigmatic example of this effect.

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id at 192.
Id. at 194.
Id. at 200.
Id.
Id. at 201.
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disciplinary power. 74 Such a system minimized the necessary number of
guards while simultaneously multiplying the possibilities for surveillance. 75
Foucault sees the Panopticon as a "figure of political technology," the "diagram of a mechanism of power reduced to its ideal form." 76 As Bentham himself observed, the Panopticon's applications extended far beyond the prison
setting. 77 Wherever continuous surveillance is required-for example, in
mental institutions, schools, workshops, poorhouses, and hospitals 7 8-this
"marvelous machine" can produce "homogenous effects of power. ' 79
Panoptic mechanisms, according to Foucault, became detached from particular institutions, such as prisons, and came to "circulate" throughout the social
body.8 0 Disciplinary institutions, such as schools and hospitals, developed
techniques for surveillance of the population beyond their walls.8 1 Foucault
describes the extension of panoptic technologies as the "swarming"8 2 of disciplinary mechanisms and the "formation of a disciplinary society. '8 3 Ultimately, Foucault suggests, the network of these disciplinary institutions and
practices form a "carceral archipelago," a "great carceral continuum"'8 4 in
which "frontiers between confinement, judicial punishment and institutions of
85
discipline" disappear.
D. Bio-power
In the closing pages of History of Sexuality, Volume I, Foucault incorporates his account of disciplinary power into a more general concept: "biopower," or, the "power over life."8 6 Bio-power, Foucault says, includes both
disciplinary power over individual bodies ("anatomo-politics") and "a bio-politics of the population." 87 While disciplinary power concerns "infinitesimal"
details of bodies and their arrangements,8 8 bio-politics addresses more global
74. Id. at 202-03.
75. See id. at 203. As Foucault puts it, the Panopticon turned the inmates into "the principle of
their own subjection." Id.

76. Id. at 205.
77. Id. at 206.
78. Id. at 202, 205.
79. Id. at 202.

80. Id. at 205-07, 211.
81. Id. at 211-212 (describing school officials' examination of pupils' home situations, medical
observation of the population at large, and social workers' monitoring of poor persons' life conduct).
82. Id. at 211.
83. Id. at 216.
84. Id. at 297.

85. Id.; see also id. at 298 ("[Ihe prison transformed the punitive procedure into a penitentiary
technique; the carceral archipelago transported this technique from the penal institution to the entire
social body."); id. at 228 ("Is it surprising that prisons resemble factories, schools, barracks, hospitals,
which all resemble prisons?").
86. 1 FOuCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SExuALrrY, supra note 16, at 139-40 (discussing the origins of
bio-power).
87. 1 id.at 139.
88. FOUCAuLT, DIscIPLNm AND PUNISH, supra note 15, at 137; see also I FOUCAULT, THE I1sTORY oF SaxuALrry, supra note 16, at 145-46 (referring to "infinitesimal surveillances" and a "nicropower concerned with the body").
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matters, such as "the problems of birthrate, longevity, public health, housing,
and migration."8 9
Sexuality is strategic terrain for bio-power, Foucault argues, because it
brings together bio-power's two "poles of development": discipline of the
body and regulation of the population. Located "at the pivot of the[se] two
axes," 90 sex provides "a means of access both to the life of the body and the
life of the species." 9' The regulation of sexuality thus involves disciplinary
control, such as examinations, surveillance, and the "meticulous orderings of
space," 92 as well as more "comprehensive measures, statistical assessments,
and interventions aimed at the entire social body or at groups taken as a
93
whole."
Foucault historicizes this notion of population in his later work on "governmentality." 94 From the sixteenth century onward, Foucault argues, political
thinkers became increasingly aware that "population has its own regularities, its
own rate of deaths and diseases, its cycles of scarcity" and its own "specific
economic effects." 95 Management of these problems required the creation of''96a
distinctive form of rationality-an "art of government" or "raison d'gtat.
Foucault describes this form of "governmental rationality"--in Foucault's neologism, "governmentality"--as a power over all and each that simultaneously
individualizes and totalizes. 97 He traces the development of this form of political rationality from its origins in antiquity and early Christianity, to the seventeenth-century cameralist police state, to early liberal society, and finally to
contemporary neo-liberal trends. 98
E.

"Power/Knowledge"

As the foregoing account of discipline and bio-power suggests, Foucault
drew a close connection between the exercise of power and the production and
deployment of knowledge. Power is productive, and one thing it produces is
knowledge. Foucault writes:
1 FoucAuLT, Ttm HisToRY oF SExuMA.rr, supra note 16, at 139-40.
1 id. at 145.
1 id. at 146.
1 id.
at 145.
1 id.
at 146
See Michel Foucault, Governmentality, in TH-E FOUCAULT ErFEcr: STUmIEs YN GovERNmENTrALrry 99-101 (Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon & Peter Miller eds., 1991); see also Michel Foucault, Omnes et Singulatim: Towards a Criticismof 'PoliticalReason' (Oct. 10 & 16, 1979), reprinted
in 2 THE TANNER LEcuRas oN HtuNiA Vua~us 223 (Sterling M. McMurrin ed., 1981).
95. Foucault, Governmentality, in Tim FoucAuLT Eiu'cr, supra note 94, at 99.
96. P. 76. "[T]he correct principles for the organisation of the state came to be seen as immanent;
the strength, economic and military, of the state itself became the goal of, and justification for, state
action."
97. See Foucault, Omnes et Singulatim, supra note 94, at 226-27; see also Colin Gordon, Government Rationality: An Introduction, in Tim FOUCAurT E"Ecr, supra note 94, at 1,2-3 ("Government as
an entity could concern the relation beteen self and self, private interpersonal relations .... relations
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

within social institutions .

.

.

. and finally relations concerned with the exercise of political

sovereignty.")
98. See generally Foucault, Omnes et Singulatim, supra note 94.
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Perhaps, too, we should abandon a whole tradition that allows us to imagine

that knowledge can exist only where the power relations are suspended and
that knowledge can develop only outside its injunctions, its demands and its
interests ....

We should admit rather that power produces knowledge... ;

that power and knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power
relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any
knowledge99 that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power
relations.
For Foucault, power thus produces knowledge, and at the same time, it produces "the individual as the effect and object of power,.., effect and object of
knowledge."' 0 0 "Human sciences" such as psychology, psychiatry, and criminology developed in the context of disciplinary power, Foucault suggests, particularly in the "ignoble archives" of the examination, "where the modem play
of coercion over bodies, gestures and behavior has its beginnings."''1 1 In turn,
those sciences remain "profoundly enmeshed in social structures,"' 102 producing

"truths" useful in the exercise of power. "[T]ruth," Foucault writes, "isn't
outside power, or lacking in power ....

Truth is a thing of this world: it is

of multiple forms of constraint. And it induces regular
produced only by virtue
10 3
effects of power."'
But just as power always implies resistance, so do the "discourses" of
power/knowledge enable counter-discourses of resistance. 10 4 Foucault de05
scribes this potential reversibility as "the tactical polyvalence of discourses."'
In other words, a particular discourse "can be both an instrument and an effect
of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling-block, a point of resistance and a
starting point for an opposing strategy."' 1 6 For example, the medical discourse
that made "the homosexual" a category and object of regulation "also made
possible the formation of a 'reverse' discourse: homosexuality began to speak
in its own behalf, to demand that its legitimacy or 'naturality' be acknowledged, often in the same vocabulary, using the same categories by which it was
medically disqualified."' 0 7 To underscore the close connection between power
and knowledge, Foucault describes the production of truth in military and political language: He refers to the "r6gime of truth" and a society's "'general
99. FOUCALLT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH, supra note 15, at 27.
100. Id. at 192.
101. Id. at 191; see also id. at 305 (explaining that the diffusion of penitentiary techniques
throughout society contributed to the rise of the human sciences); MicHEL FOUCAULT, On Power, reprinted in PoLITIcs, Pm.osoPHy, CuILruRE, supra note 13, at 96, 106 ("[T]he birth of the human sciences goes hand in hand with the installation of new mechanisms of power.").
102. FOUCAuLT, Truth and Power,supra note 13, at 109.
103. Id. at 131.
104. 1 FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SExuALnTY, supra note 16, at 100-02.
105. 1 id.at 100.
106. 1 id. at 101. Elaborating on this theme Foucault states:
Discourse transmits and produces power, it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it,
renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it. In like manner, silence and secrecy are a
shelter for power, anchoring its prohibitions; but they also loosen its holds and provide for
relatively obscure areas of tolerance.... There is not, on the one side, a discourse of power,
and opposite it, another discourse that runs counter to it.
1 id.

107. 1 id.
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politics' of truth,"10 8 including the "battle about the status of truth and the
economic and political role it plays." 10 9
F. "Genealogy" as "History of the Present"
An important aspect of Foucault's work involved mapping the "tactical
polyvalence of discourses" and tracing the transformations of "r6gimes of
truth." Foucault usually described this project as "genealogy,"' 10 self-consciously borrowing the term from Nietzsche's Genealogy ofMorals.1 11 Genealogy is not a search for the present in the past, nor is it an investigation of the
past for its own sake. 1 2 In Foucault's paradoxical phrase, genealogy is a "history of the present." 13 The genealogist diagnoses a current situation, selecting
an existing" 'ritual of power' or 'political technology of the body,' "and then
inquires how it "arose, took shape, [and] gained importance." ' l 4 The genealogist does not assume that the technology or ritual is the same, or has the same
meaning, in both past and present.
Consider, for example, Foucault's discussion of the confession in History of
Sexuality, Volume I. Foucault begins from the premise that since the Middle
Ages the confession has provided "one of the main rituals we rely on for the
production of truth."'' 5 But the confession has "undergone a considerable
transformation"' 16 since the thirteenth century, when the Church first made it a
duty for believing Christians." 7 Confessional techniques have spread beyond
the Christian confessional to become "employed in a whole series of relationships: children and parents, students and educators, patients and psychiatrists,
delinquents and experts."" 8 Modem confession generates different "motivations and effects" and has assumed new forms: "interrogations, consultations,
108. FOUCAULT, Truth and Power,supra note 13, at 131-32.
109. Id. at 132.
110. Earlier in his career, Foucault described his researches as "archaeologies." See, e.g., MICHEL
FOUCAULT, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEr E (A.M. Sheridan Smith trans., 1972); MICHEL FouCAtJLT, THE BIRTH OF Tim CLINIC: AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF MEDICAL PERcETmoN (A.M. Sheridan Smith
trans., 1973); MICHEL FOUCAULT, THm ORDER OF THINGs: AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE HumAN ScIENcs
(R.D. Laing ed., Vintage Books 1973) (1971). But because Hunt and Wickham rely almost exclusively
on Foucault's "genealogical" works, I will not address the relation between "genealogy" and "archaeology." The interested reader should consult DREYFUs AND RABrNow, supranote 13, at 44-100 (explaining Foucault's archaeological method), 104-17 (discussing the relation between Foucault's genealogical
and archaeological methods); MICHAEL MAHON, FOUCAULT'S NmTZsCHEAN GENEALoGY: TRUTH,
PowarE, AND rHmSuBJEcr 101-06, 113-19 (1994).
111. FRIEDRICH NIETzscHE, ON Tm GENEALOGY OF MORALS (Walter Kaufinann & RJ. Hollingdale trans., Vintage Books 1967) (1887). See MICHEL FOUCAULT, Prison Talk; in POWER/KNOwLEDGE, supra note 13, at 37, 53 ("If I wanted to be pretentious, I would use 'the genealogy of morals' as
the general title of what I am doing."); see also MIcHEL FOUCAULT, Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,
reprintedin LANGUAGE, COUNTER-MEMORY, PRACTICE: SL.ECaED ESSAYS AND INTERvIEws 139 (Don-

ald F. Bouchard ed., Donald F. Bouchard & Sherry Simon trans., 1977).
112. DREYFUS & RABINow, supra note 13, at 119.
113. FOUCAULT, DIsCIPLnE AND PUNISH, supra note 15, at 31.

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

DREYFUS & RABINow, supra note 13, at 119.
1 FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, supra note 16, at 58.
l id.at 63.
l id.
at 58, 60.
at 68.
1id.at 63; see also 1 id.
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autobiographical narratives, letters."' 19 A "confessional science" has developed, Foucault argues, a discourse "not of sin and salvation, but of bodies and
life processes-the discourse of science."1 20 The relation between the confession then and the confession now resembles one of ancestry or descent more
than one of identity.
Foucault's genealogies have a critical function. They serve not to "discover
the roots of our identity" or our institutions, but to render both identity and
institutions vulnerable to criticism.1 2 1 Consider, for example, the genealogy of
punishment Foucault develops in Discipline and Punish. The book, significantly subtitled "The Birth of the Prison," seeks to undermine our belief that
prisons are the inevitable form of punishment. Foucault argues that the systematic use of imprisonment as punishment is a relatively modem development,
going back no further than the nineteenth century. 122 He reviews two technologies of punishment prevalent in the century before the "birth of the prison"-first, public torture and execution, then the reformers' "picturesque" 12 3 "theatres of punishment"'124-emphasizing the different functions punishment was
thought to serve in those eras. 1 25 Foucault presents the arguments against imprisonment that seemed decisive even a few years before the triumph of the
prison, arguments that still resonate today.' 26 Immediately after the triumph of
the prison system, and ever since, Foucault argues, it "was denounced ... as
the great failure of penal justice,"' 27 because it fails to reduce the crime rate,
119. 1 id.at 63.
120. 1 id. at 64.
121. FOUCAULT, Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,supra note 111, at 162.
122. See FOUCAULT, DisciPLin AND PuNrsH, supra note 15, at 115-17.
123. Id. at 114.
124. Id. at 102-14 (describing the evolution of punishment prior to the dramatic expansion of
systematic imprisonment). The theater of punishment involved forcing the criminal to circulate publicly, bearing the signs of his crime for all to read and remember:
At the crossroads, in the gardens, at the side of roads being repaired or bridges built, in workshops open to all, in the depths of mines that may be visited, will be hundreds of tiny theatres
of punishment. Each crime will have its law; each criminal his punishment. It will be a
visible punishment, a punishment that tells all, that explains, justifies itself, convicts: placards,
different-coloured caps bearing inscriptions, posters, symbols, texts read or printed, tirelessly
repeat the code.... [T]hey should all, according to a strict economy, teach a lesson: that each
punishment should be a fable .... The great terrifying ritual of the public execution gives
way, day after day, street after street, to this serious theatre, with its multifarious and persuasive scenes.
Id. at 113.
125. For example, the public execution served to vindicate the sovereign and to display his power
to the populace. Id. at 109. For their part, reformers tried to deter crime, by punishments to counteract
the forces thought to cause particular crimes, id. at 106-07, and by educating the public about the laws
and the connection between crimes and punishments. Id. at 107-14.
126.
[I]t
is incapable of corresponding to the specificity of crimes.... [l]t has no effect on the
is useless, even harmful, to society: it is costly, it maintains convicts in
public. . . . [I]t
idleness, it multiplies their vices.... [T]he execution of such a penalty is difficult to supervise
and.., there is a risk of exposing prisoners to the arbitrary will of their guards.... [T]he job
of depriving a man of his liberty and of supervising him is an exercise of tyranny ... It is
obscurity, violence and suspicion.
Id. at 114-15 (internal citations omitted).
127. Id. at 264.
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causes recidivism, and creates career criminals. 128 Thus, for Foucault, the
prison's rise and continued 9existence are problems in need of justification, not
2
evident social necessities.'
The critical edge of Foucault's genealogies appears, further, in their tendency to trace institutions or practices back to ignoble ancestry, much as Nietzsche traced morality back to "shameful origins."' 130 In discussing the
development of a "science of sex," for example, Foucault notes the centrality of
confessional practices and remarks that "[s]ince the Middle Ages, torture has
accompanied [the confession] like a shadow, and supported it when it could go
no further: the dark twins."' 13 1 Foucault thus suggests that the confession is
genealogically linked to the project of controlling the body. Similarly, Foucault speculates that the human sciences' "birth" lies in the "'ignoble'
archives" of disciplinary power. 132 A genealogical approach to history, Foucault writes, "teaches how to laugh at the solemnities of the origin ....
[H]istorical beginnings are lowly.., derisive and ironic, capable of undoing
every infatuation."1 33 Genealogy deflates claims to disinterestedness and
134
scientificity.
II.

FoucAuLT's "ExpuLsIoN OF

LAW"

So far I have mentioned law only in connection with the juridical model of
power-the foil to Foucault's analytics of power. But what role does law play
within Foucault's analytics of power? How is it related to disciplinary power
and bio-power? In short: What role does Foucault assign law in modem
societies?
A straightforward reading of Foucault's writings on power suggests, as
Hunt and Wickham observe, that Foucault tends to "expel law from any significant role" in modem society.1 35 The argument for this "expulsion thesis" is
remarkably simple.
The first part of this argument is the link Foucault consistently establishes
between law, on one hand, and sovereignty and the "juridical" conception of
128. Id. at 264-71.
129. Id. at 120; see also id. at 271-82 (suggesting an explanation for the prison's survival, beginning from the assumption that its failures were useful).
130. FOUCAuLT, Nietzsche, Genealogy, History, supra note I11, at 141 & n.6; see Thomas Flynn,
Foucault'sMapping of History in THE CAMBRIDGE CowI ,oN To FOUCAULT 28, 35-36 (Gary Gutting
ed., 1994).
131. 1 FoucAuLT, Tim HISTORY OF S-xuAx.rry, supra note 16, at 59.
132. FoucAuLT, DisiC'ILINE AM PUNISH, supra note 15, at 191; see also note 101 supra and
accompanying text.
133. Foucault, Nietzsche. Genealogy, History, supra note 111, at 143.
134. As Foucault explains:
Genealogies are ... not positivistic returns to a more careful or exact form of science. They
are precisely anti-sciences.... We are concerned... with the insurrection of knowledges that
are opposed... to the effects of the centralising powers which are linked to the institution and
functioning of an organised scientific discourse within a society such as ours.... [I]t
is really
against the effects of the power of a discourse that is considered to be scientific that the
genealogy must wage its struggle.
FoucAuLT, Two Lectures, supra note 42, at 83-84.

135. P. 34.
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power, on the other. 136 As noted above,' 37 Foucault presents law as the sovereign's prohibitory command to an obedient subject, backed ultimately by the
138
sword. For Foucault, "power-law" is "power-sovereignty.'
The second part of the argument is the opposition Foucault establishes between modem power and sovereign power. Foucault's analytics of power attacks the "juridical" model, in which power is essentially negative and
prohibitory. In Foucault's view, power is omnipresent in society, not located
exclusively in the relation between sovereign and subject, and it is productive,
not merely negative. The specifically modem form of power, Foucault contends, is disciplinary power, and disciplinary power, he says, is "absolutely
incompatible with the relations of sovereignty."' 139 Disciplinary power, Foucault says, is "the antithesis of that mechanism of power which the theory of
sovereignty described," 14° and accordingly, it is "irreducible to the representation of law."' 141 Thus disciplinary power, he suggests, is a "sort of counterlaw."' 142 An understanding of modem power relations, Foucault contends, must
"no longer take law as a model and a code"; instead, we must "cease to con43
ceive" of power "in terms of law, prohibition ...and sovereignty.'
One could multiply the quotations from Foucault, 44 but the point would be
the same: By linking law to sovereignty, Foucault's analytics of power tends to
expel law, and his historical analysis of disciplinary power confirms this expulsion. As Hunt and Wickham observe, Foucault in these passages "presents law
as being essentially premodern."' 45 While law may "linger[ ] on in the doctrine of sovereignty," with its ideological role of masking power, "[i]n the real
world of power, law has been supplanted"'146 by disciplinary power and biopolitics.
As Hunt and Wickham observe, in other passages Foucault suggests a more
complicated picture of modem law. Sometimes, rather than "counterposing
law and discipline," Foucault "draw[s] attention to the interaction and interde136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

P. 40.
See text accompanying notes 22-32 supra.
1 FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SaxuALrrv, supra note 16, at 90.
FOUCAuLT, Two Lectures, supra note 13, at 104.
Id.
1 FOUCAULT, THE HisToRY OF SaxuALrry, supra note 16, at 89.
FoucAuLT, DisicuwE AND PUNISH, supra note 15, at 222.
1 FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SExuAUTY, supra note 16, at 90.
See, e.g., I id.
at 89 ("jT]he juridical system... is utterly incongruous with the new methods

of power whose operation is not ensured by right but by technique, not by law but by normalization ....
We have been engaged for centuries in a type of society in which the juridical is increasingly incapable

of coding power, of serving as its system of representation."); id.at 90 ("V]e must break free of... the
theoretical privilege of law and sovereignty ....WVe must construct an analytics of power that no longer
takes law as a model and code."); MICHEL FOUCAuLT, Power and Sex, reprinted in PoLrTcs, PmrosoprHY, CuLTURE,supra note 13, at 110, 123 ("[W]e know very well that law does not describe power.");

FOUCAULT, Two Lectures, supra note 13, at 102 ("[W]e should direct our researches on the nature of
power not towards the juridical edifice of sovereignty, the State apparatuses and the ideologies which
accompany them, but towards domination and the material operators of power ...We must escape from
the limited field ofjuridical sovereignty and State institutions, and instead base our analysis of power on
the study of the techniques and tactics of domination.").
145. P. 44.
146. P. 56.
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pendence of disciplinary practices and their legal framework."' 14 7 As an example, Hunt and Wickham cite Foucault's suggestion that the eighteenth century
development of "a system of rights ...egalitarian in principle was supported
by these tiny, everyday physical mechanisms, by all those systems of micropower that are essentially non-egalitarian and asymmetrical that we call the
disciplines."'1 48 Here, Foucault suggests that law and discipline are complementary, not fundamentally opposed: By guaranteeing submissive bodies,
disciplines constitute[ ] the foundation of the formal, jurid"[t]he real, corporal
14 9
ical liberties."'
Still, as Hunt and Wickham note, we should not make too much of this
passage. As they point out, Foucault seems here to treat modem constitutionalism as merely an ideological form, a masking of "real" and "corporal" power
with "formal" and "juridical" liberties. 150 One may be skeptical about what
constitutional democracies actually deliver, yet still consider democracy more
than an ideological screen for disciplinary power. 151 Further, Foucault's imagery-disciplinary power underlies the modem legal framework-seems misleading. Disciplinary power, such as an employer's power, seems to
presuppose a whole set of legal categories and rules concerning who may exercise such power and how they may exercise it.152 Law thus does not simply
rest atop the "foundation" of disciplinary power; it helps constitute disciplinary
power. 153 Finally, there remain the many passages, cited above, in which Foucault presents law and discipline as fundamentally opposed.
The source of the problem is easy to identify. Foucault equates law with
the idea of negative, prohibitory, sovereign command, while at the same time
he distinguishes modem forms of power from sovereign command. Foucault's
second point seems clearly correct: The model of sovereign command does not
accurately describe many modem relations of power. The solution to the "expulsion" problem, then, must be to weaken the link between law and sovereign
command.
Foucault's own work, however, offers few resources for reformulating his
notion of law as sovereign command. As Hunt and Wickham observe, "law
147. P. 47.
148. FOUCAULT, DiscIPLinE AND PUNISH, supra note 15, at 222.
149. Id.
150. Pp. 61-62 (quoting FOUCAULT, DIsCn a AND PUNiSH, supra note 15, at 222).
151. See p. 62. Hunt and Wickham explain their disagreement with Foucault as follows:
Modem democracy and constitutionalism has to be approached as a dilemma, that is, with a
genuine doubt about its achievements and its potential for realising participatory democracy.
The deficiency in Foucault is not that he problematises constitutional democracy, but that his
answer comes down so unambiguously on one side of the dilemma.

Id.
152. See Jonathan Simon, "In Another Kind of Wood": Michel Foucault and SociolegalStudies,
17 LAW & Soc. INQuiRY 49, 50-51 & n.4 (1992).
153. Cf.Robert W. Gordon, CriticalLegal Histories, 36 STAN. L. Rnv. 57, 103 (1984) ("[I]n

practice, it is just about impossible to describe any set of 'basic' social practices without describing the
legal relations among the people involved-legal relations that don't simply condition how the people
relate to each other but to an important extent define the constitutive terms of the relationship, relations
such as lord and peasant, master and slave, employer and employee, ratepayer and utility, and taxpayer
and municipality.").
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[wa]s never one of [Foucault's] major objects of inquiry."'1 54 Despite Foucault's many detailed genealogies of other "specialised professional discourses," he "simply takes no account of the internal and substantive aspects of
the development of legal thought."' 15 5 The result of this inattention is an inadequate conception of law, as Hunt and Wickham recognize. Foucault's "imperative conception of law,"' 1 6 in which law is the sanction-backed command of
the sovereign, "equates 'law' with the punitive forms of criminal law."'157 This
conception, like Austin's positivist notion of "law as command of the sovereign," has a fatal weakness: It omits the "great bulk '" 5 8 of law, as H.L.A. Hart
pointed out against Austin.15 9 For example, rules governing property and contract provide a framework for bargaining and other activity, but they neither
command nor forbid particular actions. Nor are rules governing court procedure or allocating authority among governmental entities best described as
commands from sovereign to subject. In short, Foucault's conception of law as
sovereign command is too crude a tool for understanding modem law.
Hunt and Wickham deserve great credit, for diagnosing the "expulsion of
law" from Foucault's account of power and identifying the inadequacy of his
conception of law.' 60 Their discoveries, however, raise a further difficulty. If
Foucault lacks a plausible theory of law and never seriously investigated legal
matters, why should contemporary legal scholars bother themselves with his
writings? What in Foucault's work makes him relevant to legal studies, if his
understanding of law was so primitive?
This difficulty is not as insuperable as it might first seem. Legal scholars
who borrow from disciplines such as economics or game theory, for example,
routinely appropriate work that does not itself contain a developed, built-in
theory of law. In these interdisciplinary borrowings the question is not whether
the appropriated theory has itself gotten law right, but whether it contributes
anything useful to ongoing work in legal scholarship. Similarly, even if Foucault's explicit discussions of law lead to a dead end, we might still ask
whether the Foucaultian concepts, themes and methods outlined in Part I are
useful or illuminating for legal scholarship. This interpretation of Foucault
would focus less on the sentences in his work containing the word "law," and
154. P. viii.
155. P. 68.

156. P. 59.
157. P. 59; accord DUNcAN KENNEDY, The Stakes of Law, or Hale and Foucault!, reprinted in

SEx, DREssImG ETC. 83, 119 (1993) ("Foucault is unmistakably a 'eriminalist' in his understanding of
law").

158. P.60.
159. Cf H.L.A. HART, THE CoNc-vr OF LAW (1961).
160. Hunt first published the expulsion of law thesis in 1992. See Alan Hunt, Foucault'sExpulsion ofLaw: Toward a Retrieval, 17 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 1 (1992). This 1992 article was a revision of
a working paper Hunt prepared in 1991. See ALAN HUNT, WHY"DID FOUCAULT GEr LAw So WRONG?
REFLECTIONS ON LAW, PowER AND SovEREIGNTY (Carleton University Department of Sociology and
Anthropology Working Paper 91-4). In that same year, Duncan Kennedy published a similar critique of
Foucault's "criminalist" conception of law. See Duncan Kennedy, The Stakes of Law, or Hale and
Foucault!, 15 LEGAL STuD. FORUM 327 (1991), reprinted in KENNEDY, supra note 157.
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more on the possible connections between other aspects of Foucault's work and
the concerns of contemporary legal theory.
Hunt endorsed this sort of interpretation in a 1992 article on which Foucault andLaw extensively relies. 161 There, Hunt described his approach as "an
exercise in retrieval."1 62 After diagnosing Foucault's expulsion of law, Hunt
sought "to recuperate much in his thought that is suggestive and illuminating
for our understanding of the complex role of law in the constitution of modem
163
society."
In Foucault and Law, Hunt and Wickham at first suggest a similar approach. "This book," they say in the introduction, "aims... to demonstrate the
pertinence of Foucault for contemporary issues in legal studies."' 64 My contention in the next section, however, will be that the aim of "retrieving" Foucault competes with another goal: the inauguration of a "new subdiscipline"' 65
called "the sociology of law as governance."
1I.

HUNT AND WICKHAM'S "SOCIOLOGY OF LAW AS GOVERNANCE"

Hunt and Wickham begin the second half of their book by briefly reviewing
Foucault's later essays and speeches on "govemmentality," in which he sought
to describe historically the modem concern with "population." 16 6 Hunt and
Wickham suggest in passing that "[i]n this phase of [Foucault's] work the earHer expulsion of law from modernity is significantly modified." 167 But they
also acknowledge and quote passages from Foucault to opposite effect,' 6 8 and
in any event, they do not linger over the details of Foucault's investigations into
"govemmentality."
From this point on, the authors concern themselves with the construction of
their new subdiscipline, leaving the connections to Foucault's work largely implicit. In their words, they "do not spend much energy.., relating [their]
16 9
points directly to Foucault."'
A.

The Principlesof "Law as Governance"

"Governance," the central concept of Hunt and Wickham's new subdiscipline, is an extraordinarily broad notion. It includes "any attempt to control
or manage any known object," where an "object" may be "any phenomenon
which human beings try to control or manage."'170 The authors' definition of
"governance" combines three definitions: " 'government,' as in the rule of a
161.

Hunt, supra note 160.

162. Id.at 3.
163. Id.
164. P. viii.
165. P. 122.

166. P.55; see also text accompanying notes 94-98 supra.
167. P. 55.
168. See, e.g., p. 52 ("[Tlime and again [Foucault] stresses the essentially non-legal character of
his expanded conception of government."); p. 53 (quoting Foucault's remark that "[w]ithin the perspective of government, law isnot what is important).

169. P. 75.
170. P. 78.
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nation-state, region, or municipal area; 'self-government,' as in control of one's
own emotions and behavior; and 'governor,' as in devices fitted to machines to
17
regulate their energy intake and hence control or manage their performance." 1
The first two definitions emphasize the breadth of "governance," while the last
suggests its "machine-like" quality. 172
Hunt and Wickham devote most of the latter half of their book to an elaboration of various "principles" relevant to the "sociology of law as governance."
173
They articulate four "content principles" applying generally to governance,
four corollary content principles applying to the special case of "law as governance,"'17 4 and four "method principles."' 175 The authors then offer a brief (six176
page) illustration of these principles at work.
1. Content principles.
According to the first general content principle, governance is a cyclical
and perpetual process. Attempts at control are inevitably incomplete, leading
to further attempts at control. 177 Governmental attempts to control unemployment, for example, are only partially successful at best, and the process is unending.' 78 Governance continues not in spite of incompleteness or failure,
179
Hunt and Wickham contend, but because of it.
According to Hunt and Wickham's second principle, governance involves
"power," "politics," and "resistance."' 8 0 By "power," Hunt and Wickham
mean "the technical process whereby all aspects of social life are produced, the
process of governance. . . . [and] the techniques which make up that process."' 8 The focus, therefore, is on technique and process, not on outcomes or
distributions. 182 By "politics," they mean that techniques of governance are
always at least potentially contestable. 183 Because any existing technique of
governance has been selected from among alternatives, every operation of governance involves politics-the contestation of governance.184 In this sense,
171. Pp. 78-79.
172. See pp. 80-83 (providing mechanical metaphors for "governance").

173. Pp. 79-97.
174. Pp. 102-16.
175. Pp. 117-26.
176. Pp. 127-32. Throughout their discussion, Hunt and Wickham present these individual principles as one-sentence pronouncements, followed by examples and explanation. The two sets of content
principles share identical formulations, except that in the second set the authors insert the words "law
as" before the word "governance." They then repeat, with different examples, much of what they said
about the corresponding principle of governance in general. I focus here on the general principles of
governance, then explain what is particular about "law as governance."
177. P. 80.

178. Pp. 79-80.
179. P. 80. Here Hunt and Wickham could have mentioned Foucault's account of the perpetual
process of prison reform. See text accompanying notes 122-129 Supra.

180. P. 80.
181. P. 81. Notice that Hunt and Wickham define governance in terms of power, and power in
terms of governance. The same problem appears in their alternative characterization of power as "the
vast array of governing techniques which come together in various combinations as governance." P. 81.
182. Pp. 81-82.

183. Pp. 82-83.
184. Pp. 82-83.
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they say, even the "governance" of "a piece of fruit" implicates politics.185 As
in Foucault, resistance, "the 'counter-stroke' to power,' 86 is part of any situation of governance: "Power and resistance are together the governance
87
machine of society."'
Throughout their discussion of power, politics, and resistance, Hunt and
Wickham emphasize their interest in "mundanely productive" power, not spectacular acts of power or resistance.18 8 They note that in contrast to "many
years of political theory and analysis," their "underlying picture of society...
reflects [a] predominance of passive and mundane politics."'18 9 While "the
politics associated with governance sometimes feature 'exploitation' and 'repression,' "190 these are not, in Hunt and Wickham's view, the "types of contest which predominate in the world." 19 1 The authors refer instead to
"advantage" and "disadvantage" in describing political outcomes, reserving
192
terms such as "oppression" and "exploitation" for extraordinary cases.
The third and fourth content principles require less explanation. "Governance always involves knowledge," Hunt and Wickham maintain.' 93 Whether
this knowledge is simple or complex, formal or informal, depends upon the
objects in question and the context of governance. Finally, "[g]overnance is
always social":1 94 both in the sense that its objects and techniques are limited
to those that are socially available, 95 and in the sense that it "bind[s] societies
together,"' 196 however provisionally, unstably, and incompletely.' 97 At the
same time, this binding "involves social division."'198 That is, while governance may form communities, communities always exclude others as strangers;
while governance may establish moralities, moralities imply transgressors who
must be excluded. 199
Because law is necessarily a form of governance, these four principles apply to the study of law. 2 °0 To capture the particularity of law as a form of
governance, however, Hunt and Wickham first propose a definition of law, then
apply the principles to the special case of law as governance.
185. P. 82.
186. P. 83 (emphasizing the "strong technical, machine-like connotations" of Foucault's words).
187. Id.
188. Pp. 81, 84.
189. P. 84.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Pp. 84-85.
193. P. 87.
194. See pp. 92-94. Hunt and Wickham mention Foucault's notion of "the social" as a regulatory
theme invented in the 19th century, pp. 92-93, hut opt for the more standard sociological notion of the
"social" as "that which pre-exists individuals in consideration of the collective actions of individuals."
P. 92.
195. Pp. 92-94.
196. P. 92.
197. P. 94.
198. P. 92.
199. See pp. 94-95. Hunt and Wickham acknowledge this principle's roots in both Durkheim and
Foucault. Pp. 92-95.
200. See p. 99.
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The authors' definition of law, like their definition of governance in general, is extremely broad. Law is to be understood operationally-that is, not as
'' 20
a set of rules or texts, or as a collection of institutions, but as "doing[s]. 1
Law can be found everywhere-not just in courts or legislatures and not only
when particular rules or texts are at issue. Adapting Weber's famous definition
of law, 20 2 Hunt and Wickham see law as "an operation [that] involves a calculation... towards conformity with an historically received norm or the avengement of a violation of such a norm,"20 3 where specialized personnel (such as
judges) stand ready to enforce the norm.204 Within this broad definition, the
operation of law includes not only the prosecution, conviction, and punishment
of theft, but also the theft itself, its reporting, and its investigation: All involve
the requisite calculation. 20 5 Likewise, the act of keeping books in a business
firm is an operation of law, because it "involves daily calculations by company
officials, using a quite formal means of accounting calculation, towards con'20 6
formity with an historically received norm of corporate accountability.
These examples, the authors suggest, indicate "the pervasiveness of law in the
modem era" and illustrate that law operates "as part of the routine practice of
'20 7
daily life."
In their account of law, as in their general account of governance, Hunt and
Wickham emphasize the "technical" and "mundane" nature of most governance. 20 8 Law, like other forms of governance, implicates power, politics, and
resistance, but conflict is not necessarily dramatic. Again, Hunt and Wickham
'20 9
distance themselves from terms such as "oppression" and "exploitation.
2., Method principles.
The "field" of investigation thus bounded, Hunt and Wickham introduce
four "method principles." These "rules of the game" follow "the spirit of Durk2 10
heim" and his Rules of Sociological Method.
201. Id.
202. See MAx WEBEa, ECONOMY AND Soci my': AN Ou'nm OF Irralu'rrrwE SOCIOLOGY 34
(Guenther Roth, Claus Wittich eds., Ephraim Fisehoff, Hans Gerth, A.M. Henderson, Ferdinand Kolegar, C. Wright Mills, Talcott Parsons, Max Rheinstein, Guenther Roth, Edward Shils, & Claus Wittich,
trans., 1968) ("An order will be called ... law if it is externally guaranteed by the probability that
physical or psychological coercion will be applied by a staff of people in order to bring about compliance or avenge violation.").
203. P. 100

204. Id.
205. Pp. 100-01.
206. P. 102.
207. Id.

208. See, e.g., pp. 104, 106, 128-29 ("technical"); pp. 104, 106, 108, 110, 130-31 ("mundane").
209. Pp. 106-07 (arguing that only long-term studies of legal politics can reveal the structural
disadvantage called "oppression").
210. EMIIE Dutimmi, THE RuLas OF SOCIOLOoICAL MEMOD (Steven Lukes, ed., & W.D. Halls,

trans., 10th ed. Free Press 1982) (1895); see pp. 116-117. Hunt and Wickham assert that "Foucault
refuses to be pinned down on matters of method." P. 117. This claim is questionable. Consider, for
example, Foucault's outline of his "analytics of power" in History ofSexuality, Volume . He presents
that analytics in a section entitled "Method" that describes "four rules to follow." 1 FOUCAuLT, Tim
HISTORY OF SaxuA.Arry, supra note 16, at 98-102. While he allows that these rules are not "method-

ological imperatives" but "at most... cautionary prescriptions" introduced in a "preliminary way," 1 id.
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According to the first method principle, "[t]he sociology of law as governance works to compile social facts in a genealogical manner."2' 1 The authors
view this method of investigation as a comparative, historical approach that
gathers "facts from different societies and different eras." 2 12 The investigation
begins with some present situation or problem (abortion, for example). It then
highlights the contingent nature of prevailing governance techniques, by emphasizing alternative techniques of governance, and by illuminating the particular (also contingent) social conditions that make some techniques more
plausible than others.2 1 3 Like Foucault, Hunt and Wickham design their genealogies "to disturb the obviousness of the present" by describing it as "a collec'2 14
tion of contingencies.
Under the second method principle, these genealogies must be detailed and
meticulous: "The only tools employed by the sociology of law as governance
are attention to detail and careful generalisation."2 1 5 The study of law as governance is not a2 1predictive
science.2 16 It does not identify "causes" or produce
"explanations" 7-just details and "careful generalisations. 2 18 When in
doubt whether a generalization is sufficiently careful, Hunt and Wickham coun2 19
sel, compile more detail.
Even if the adherent to sociology of law as governance complies faithfully
with the requirement of care and detail, the authors lament, the work may still
be used for ignoble purposes. 2 0 Among the potential abuses, Hunt and Wickham identify political uses by either side in a political controversy. 22' The
third method principle therefore requires that uses of research must be distinguished from "[t]he basic production work" itself 2 22 Nevertheless, according
at 98, it still seems misleading to say he "refuses to be pinned down on matters of method." Similarly,
in PowerKnowledge, Foucault presents his approach to power in terms of "methodological precautions." FOUCAULT, Two Lectures, supra note 42, at 96-103. And in Discipline and Punish, Foucault
lists the "four general rules" of method he follows in that book. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH,
supra note 15, at 23. One might criticize Foucault for changing methodological principles from one
work to the next, but the same criticism applies to Hunt. See note 222 infra.
211. P. 117. Hunt and Wickham hasten to point out that they mean "social facts" in Durkheim's
sense, and that Durkheim's term 'faitsocial" is perhaps better translated as "social doing." P. 118.
212. P. 119.
213. See pp. 118-20.
214. P. 119.
215. P. 120.
216. P. 121.
217. P. 124.
218. See p. 121.
219. P. 122.
220. See id.
221. P. 123 (using abortion as their example).
222. P. 122. Hunt's prior work on Foucault did not draw such a sharp separation between scholarship and political uses of scholarship. In his 1992 article, on which the book's exposition and critique of
Foucault draws heavily, Hunt saw a more intimate connection between scholarship and political
commitment:

An alternative politics must ground itself in the project of working through the linkages between multiple fields of struggle that Foucault's crucial insight into the dispersal and prolifera-

tion of the sites of power makes possible. The retrieval of law from the expulsion to which
Foucault subjects it is one of the most important components of such a project.
Hunt, supra note 160, at 38.
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to the fourth method principle, practitioners of the "law as governance" approach must still consider those uses. The sociology of law as governance is
"reflexive" in precisely this respect. The subdiscipline must take itself as an
object of its own investigations, ferreting out misuses by practitioners and
223
others.
B. Evaluating Hunt and Wickham's "Sociology of Law as Governance"
One can read Hunt and Wickham's plea for a "sociology of law as governance" in either of two ways: as a free-standing research proposal, or as the
completion of a book that seeks to "demonstrate the pertinence of Foucault for
contemporary issues in legal studies." 4 While my main interest is in whether
the authors have shown the relevance of Foucault to modem legal theory, I
want to note, briefly, two reservations about whether the governance approach
will prove as "fruitful" 22 5 for future research as the authors suggest.
One reservation concerns the image of scholarly activity I discern in Hunt
and Wickham's sketch of the governance approach. The authors' tactic of
promulgating eight principles for the subdiscipline's practitioners to follow
makes the governance approach seem more rule-bound and dogmatic than Hunt
and Wickham likely intended. Further, the authors' explication of the subdiscipline's method principles makes day-to-day research work seem oppressive
and sterile. The sociologist22 of
law as governance must compile details with
"great care and exactness," 6 then carefully attempt generalizations from this
mass of details. When in doubt whether a generalization is sufficiently careful,
Hunt and Wickham caution, "further detail should be compiled before another
generalisation is attempted. 22z 7 Hunt and Wickham use the expression "more
and more details" no fewer than three times, in less than two pages.2 28 These
repeated exhortations begin to sound like something more than reminders of
acknowledged scholarly virtues. Considered together with the authors' sharp
distinction between scholarship and the uses of scholarship,2 2 9 the laborious
compilation of detail begins to seem an end in itself.
The second reservation concerns the way Hunt and Wickham choose to
present the world of "governance." Their central metaphor presents governHunt and Wickham also seem particularly concerned that their work will be used to generate causal

explanations or predictions. See p. 124. This concern contrasts with Hunt's emphasis, in his 1992
article, on the importance of causal analysis. See Hunt, supra, at 32 ("Foucault's epistemological wari-

ness led him to avoid pronouncing on causality in his historical studies, thereby incapacitating himself
from providing a satisfactory account of how specific discourses arose or how they came to prevail over
rival discourses."); id. at 33 ("Those who are concerned, as I am, not to relinquish a concern with
causality ... must add to our conceptual apparatus."); id. at 34 (endorsing "the strong Marxist concern
with causality").
223. Pp. 125-26. Hunt and Wickham acknowledge, however, that no method "can ever be applied
in a 'pure,' institutionally uncontaminated, apolitical way." P. 126.
224. P. viii.
225. Id.
226. P. 120.
227. P. 122.
228. Pp. 120-21.
229. See text accompanying notes 220-222 supra.
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ance as a "machine"2 30 whose features, Hunt and Wickham repeatedly remind
us, are "technical" and "mundane." 231 The authors' "underlying picture of society," they say, "reflects [a] predominance of passive and mundane politics. '232 So anxious are Hunt and Wickham to avoid charged terms, such as
"struggle" and "exploitation," 233 that they describe even the hotly contested
issue of "[r]esistance to or by the police" as "also a technical matter."234 While
the authors assert that politics, power, and resistance are the leading concepts of
the governance approach, these concepts flatten out in the metaphor of governance as machine. Politics indeed involves forces of power and resistance. But
politics extends beyond the choice among techniques of control or management
to include the contest among values and broader social visions. The image of
governance as machine does not seem well-chosen to capture the richness and
texture of political life.
Perhaps Hunt and Wickham's future work will depart from the metaphors
and images of their proposal. Indeed, some aspects of this approach-such as
the emphasis on law's ubiquity and the perpetual incompleteness of legal regulation-seem promising. Future uses of the "law as governance" approach,
however, are not my main concern. More important, for present purposes, is
the problem with which I closed my earlier discussion of Foucault's "expulsion
of law": If Foucault's work lacks a plausible theory of law, in what sense can it
be useful for legal scholarship? Does the authors' outline of law as governance
explain how Foucault's work is, or may be made, useful to legal academics?
In my view, it does not. One difficulty is that in developing their "law as
governance" approach, Hunt and Wickham stop speaking directly to legal academics. They describe their approach as a subdiscipline of the sociology of
law, influenced principally by Durkheim 235 and Weber, 236 but also by Machia237
vellian political theory, ethnomethodological sociology, and Talcott Parsons.
This appeal to the sociological tradition may speak to scholars working in sociology departments on the sociology of law. But what of legal academics, Hunt
and Wickham's other intended audience? 238 The authors themselves complain
of the "intellectual insularity" that has excluded even Weber from the legal
academic canon. 239 How, then, can an appeal to the sociological tradition
reach these same intellectually insular lawyers?
Hunt and Wickham further alienate their legal academic audience by
describing their project as if it were wholly conventional and dated. They admit, for example, that their four method principles "make the sociology of law
as governance look remarkably similar to many nineteenth-century sociological
230. See pp. 80-81, 82, 83, 104, 106.
231. See, e.g., pp. 104, 106, 128-29 ("technical"); pp. 104, 106, 108, 110, 130-31 ("mundane").
232. P. 84.

233. See id.
234. P. 130.
235. E.g., pp. 92, 94-97, 100, 112, 114-20, 126, 132 (discussing Durkheim).
236. E.g., pp. 76, 99-100, 117, 126 (discussing Weber).

237. P. 78.
238. See p. vii.
239. Id.
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ventures," particularly those "British and continental sociological projects
which sought to map a social terrain and which saw little difference between
statistics and sociology. '240 Despite having chosen to write a book on Foucault-a controversial figure on the contemporary intellectual scene-Hunt
and Wickham close that book with an invocation of conventional sociological
work and the past:
In many respects the sociology of law as governance's approach ... is not
dramatically different from other sociological approaches ....[T]his is not a
cause for concern; quite the reverse. In examining Foucault's work on law and
in building a framework for a new sociology of law as governance out of this
examination, we have been clear all along that the name Foucault does not
signal an intellectual revolution. Rather, we have shown that it signals an opportunity to return to some nineteenth- and early twentieth-century sociological
endeavors; hence our keenness to use Foucault's insights alongside those of
Durkheim. The best way to use Foucault's work, we suggest, is an instrument
for ground clearing, surveying and mapping; such is our approach to Foucault
and law.24 1
This description of the project will not likely appeal to Hunt and Wickham's legal academic audience-those few academic lawyers curious enough
to pick up a book about Foucault. The reader can't help but wonder why she
worked through panopticism, power/knowledge, and bio-power, only to end up
"retum[ing] to some nineteenth- and early twentieth-century sociological endeavors," with Foucault useful only for "ground clearing, surveying and
'242
mapping.
The underlying problem is that the two halves of Foucault and Law fit
together uneasily. The second half of the book develops a "new framework for
the sociology of law."'243 The first half, however, explores the work of a
thinker who "does not have a theory of law.... because law [wa]s never one of
his major objects of inquiry." 244 As Hunt and Wickham recognize, rebuilding
Foucault's work to include a plausible theory of law would be a difficult task in
itself, and even a rebuilt Foucault would not have gotten Hunt and Wickham
where they wanted to go. Thus, they disavow any intent to "construct a 'Foucaultian theory of law,' ",245 and in developing their subdiscipline's various
content and method principles they relate their discussion "only occasionally"
to Foucault. 246 Foucault moves off-stage, and the project of constructing their
new subdiscipline begins to take precedence over the authors' aim of "demonstrat[ing] the pertinence of Foucault for contemporary issues in legal
studies." 24 7

240. P. 126. They note their use of "genealogy" makes the comparison "somewhat inaccurate,"
but add that "in terms of the spirit of methodology, the comparison is accurate." P. 126.
241. P. 132.
242. Id.
243. P. viii.
244. Id.
245. P. viii.
246. P. 75.
247. P. viii.
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While I sympathize with the authors' refusal to construct a "Foucaultian
theory of law," I wish they had tried to show more directly Foucault's relevance to contemporary issues in legal studies. Rather than outlining a "new
approach" to the sociology of law, in which Foucault takes his place alongside
Durkheim and Weber, Hunt and Wickham could have examined how Foucaultian concepts and themes are already at work in exemplary texts of legal scholarship, or considered how they might be put to use. This inquiry would not
develop a general theory of law, Foucaultian or otherwise. But it might demonstrate more clearly and directly Foucault's relevance to the interests of at least
some legal academics.
IV.

USES OF FOUCAULT IN AMERICAN LEGAL STUDIES

Hunt and Wickham describe legal scholars' attention to Foucault as "marginal." 248 In most instances, this description is literally accurate. Most of Foucault's appearances in legal scholarship are in footnotes, where he stays just
is familiar with European
long enough to create the impression that the author
249
theory, then disappears without doing any work.
Not all uses of Foucault fit this pattern, however. Some legal scholars have
appropriated insights or concepts from Foucault; a few have sensed the deficiencies in, and sought to revise, Foucault's understanding of law. I want to
discuss, briefly, two such appropriations of Foucault. These works, by exceptional scholars extraordinarily well-versed in theory, illustrate a point that Hunt
and Wickham suggest: "Applying" Foucault to law, particularly if it means
inserting Foucaultian concepts into legal argument, requires caution.
Mark Barenberg's article, Democracy andDomination in the Law of Workplace Cooperation,250 focuses on the problem of "company unions" under the
National Labor Relations Act. Barenberg seeks to illuminate this issue by examining the "technologies of power" management uses in exercising "disciplinary power" over the workforce. 25 1 Barenberg connects this disciplinary
power to law. For Barenberg, law is not external to or opposed to discipline, as
Foucault often suggested; rather, by defining and regulating relations between
labor and management, law influences the scope of the employer's disciplinary
power, as well as the range of possible worker resistance.
Although Barenberg does not directly address Foucault's views on law, he
seems to recognize that Foucault's work is lacking in that respect. He therefore
presents his connection between law and discipline as a shift of emphasis in
248. P. vii.
249. We all know this kind of footnote; there's no reason to single anyone out as an example.
250. Mark Barenberg, Democracy and Domination in the Law of Workplace Cooperation:From
Bureaucraticto Flexible Production, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 753 (1994).
251. Id. at 773 n.45 (citing FOuCAuLT, Two Lectures, supra note 42, at 104-06). Barenberg also
refers to the "panoptic workplace," which employs a high-tech version of the methods Foucault discussed in Discipline and Punish. Id. at 909-10 (citing FOUCAULT, Dlscn'Lnm AND PUNI sH, supra note

15); see also notes 72-79 supra and accompanying text. Discussing the "principle of visualization,"

Barenberg notes that a panoptic workplace design "leaves work stations open to the view of coworkers
and managers," with "[w]orkers' performance data ... publicly displayed and formally discussed."
Barenberg, supra note 250, at 910.
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Foucault's account of power. Whereas Foucault "highlights the way in which
power is 'locally' instituted," Barenberg "reemphasizes the legal realists' and
positivists' familiar insight that the legal regime's coercive and ideological authority ultimately stands behind the employer's disciplinary regime. '252 In
fact, Barenberg establishes a closer 'connection between law and discipline than
the words "stands behind" suggest. Disciplinary power, he argues, is ultimately
"delegated" state legislative power. 253 In constructing and enforcing workplace rules, Barenberg says, the employer engages in "private law-making,"
and the state stands ready to enforce the employer's sanctions for violations of
254
the employer's law.
But Barenberg's strategy of connecting Foucault's "analytics of power" to
the realist notion of delegated power raises a problem. Presenting employer
power as delegated state legislative power suggests that power is ultimately
sovereign power, that disciplinary power in the workplace arises from the sovereign's decision to bestow a portion of its power upon the employer. In other
words, Barenberg's attempt to outfit Foucault's analytics of power with a plausible theory of law leads Barenberg back to the "discourse of sovereignty" that
255
Foucault's analytics of power expressly criticized.
A similar problem arises in Kendall Thomas's article, Beyond the Privacy
Principle.256 Thomas relies heavily on Foucault's notion of power in arguing
that the state action doctrine should cover "private" violence against gays and
lesbians.25 7 Thomas first observes that Foucault's theory of power "urges us to
abandon a unitary conception of power as that which is concentrated in the
state."'25 8 Modem power is dispersed power, and it is relational, not a thing or
a "possessory interest. '259 Even when power is not exercised by a formal state
apparatus, Thomas argues, it may still be an "effective exercise of state
power."

2 60

252. Barenberg, supra note 250, at 773 n.45.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. See I FOUCAULT, THE HisToRY oF SExuALrrY, supra note 16, at 93; see also text accompanying notes 21-49 supra. Barenberg may escape from this problem, however, because his reference to
"delegated state power" is unnecessary. To explain the connection between disciplinary power and law,
he need only say exactly what he said before invoking "delegation": Law "ultimately stands behind the
employer's disciplinary regime," to the extent the employer can have the resistant or disobedient employee hauled from the premises. The law, in other words, is an important element in the workplace
power relation-important both to the exercise of power and to the possibility of resistance. Barenberg
does not need to translate disciplinary power into delegated sovereign power to make this argument.
256. Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle,92 COLUM. L. Ray. 1431 (1992).

257. See id. at 1478-90.
258. Id. at 1480 (emphasis omitted).
259. Id.

260. Id. at 1481. Thomas relies for this point not on Foucault, but on Nicos Poulantzas. See id.
(citing Nicos PouLANrzAs, STATE, PowEa, SocALisM 36-37 (Patrick Camiller trans., Verso 1980)
(1978)). This reliance is problematic. Despite Thomas's implication that Foucault and Poulantzas are
allies on the question of state power, Poulantzas sharply criticizes Foucault's view of power, particularly

state power. See PouLT.NzAs, supra, at 149 ("One can deduce from Foucault nothing more than a
guerilla war and scattered acts of harassment of power.").
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Tracing the connections between "private" violence and the state regulatory
interest asserted in (so-called) homosexual sodomy statutes, 26 ' Thomas concludes that "the actual, concrete effect of these laws is to legitimize the lawless
infliction of homophobic violence. '262 Accordingly, he maintains, "violence
against gays and lesbians perpetrated by other citizens" raises a constitutional
issue, because such violence "represents the states' constructive delegation of
governmental power to these citizens." 2 63 As with Barenberg's attempt to connect law and disciplinary power, however, Thomas's idea of delegated state
power is difficult to reconcile with Foucault. Once again, the attempt to incorporate Foucault's analytics of power into the legal context seems to lead us
back to the discourse of sovereignty Foucault sought to escape.
Throughout I have been assuming that we must try, with Foucault, to avoid
recourse to the discourse of sovereignty. But why did Foucault so arduously
seek to escape that discourse? His main objection was that the language of
sovereignty neither describes the techniques by which power is actually exercised nor focuses sufficiently on the effects of power.264 We mischaracterize
power when we see it as following the single model of the legal command. 26 5
And we misunderstand it when we seek it "in the primary existence of a central
point, in a unique source of sovereignty from which secondary and descendent
forms would emanate. '2 66 Foucault's objection, in short, was that the language
of sovereignty misdescribes power relations.
Thomas uses Foucault's analytics of power to make exactly this point in the
context of American constitutional theory. Constitutional law sees "power in
terms of possession," Thomas observes, but Foucault's work makes clear that
this "highly formalistic conception of power

. . .

is too crude a conceptual

resource for understanding the actual operation of political power in contemporary societies." 267 This use of Foucault corresponds well to the impulse behind
Foucault's analytics of power: We misunderstand modem power when we see
it in terms of sovereignty and possession.
But Foucault proves less helpful for Thomas' ultimate purpose. Thomas
seeks not only to describe the exercise of power in modem society, but to frame
an argument within the discourse of constitutional law: that apparently private
violence against lesbians and gays should qualify as "state action" for constitutional purposes. 268 In advocating this position, Thomas shifts from the analytics of power to the discourse of constitutional law. "In assessing the
constitutionality of these laws" he says, "I would argue that violence against
gays and lesbians perpetrated by other citizens represents the states' construc261. Thomas, supra note 256, at 1482-90.
262. Id. at 1487 (emphasis deleted).
263. Id. at 1481-82.
264. See text accompanying notes 136-142 supra.
265. See, e.g., FOUCAtrLT, Power and Sex, supra note 144, at 123 ("We know very well that law
does not describe power."); 1 FOUCAuLT, THE HisToRY oF SExuALrry, supranote 16, at 92 ("By power,
I do not mean ...a mode of subjugation which, in contrast to violence, has the form of the rule.").
266. 1 FoUcAuLT, THm HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, supra note 16, at 93.
267. Thomas, supra note 256, at 1478.
268. See id. at 1481-92.
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tive delegation of governmental power to these citizens. '269 Thomas' use of
the words "represents" and "constructive" shows that he is engaging in legal
fiction: It is as ifthe state had delegated its power to the perpetrators of violence. He is employing, in other words, not Foucault's analytics of power, but
a standard and "highly formalistic" '270 technique of constitutional argument.
Constitutional discourse, it seems, requires this formalism of Thomas, and it
repels any simple insertion of Foucault's analytics of power.
It would not have surprised Foucault to find that legal discourse--or at
least some forms of legal discourse-may be linked inescapably to notions of
sovereignty.2 71 For Foucault, one discourse cannot necessarily be folded into

another. One possible consequence may be that his work cannot always be
simply "applied" directly in legal argument. Foucault designed his analytics of
power to deemphasize the state, to show that the actual exercise of power is
dispersed throughout the social order, not concentrated in the state apparatus.
Constitutional law, by contrast, requires those challenging a particular exercise
of power to attribute that power to the state. Further, even in private law contexts, the Realist-inspired strategy for making "private" power visible is to
describe it as a constructive delegation of state power. 272 Foucault's work operates more readily as a challenge to standard legal constructions of the world
than it does as a direct intervention into conventional forms of legal argument.
A different way legal academics might use Foucault is to develop some of
the themes he suggested without directly impressing him into service in legal
argument. A good illustration of how Foucault might be used in this way is an
article that never mentions Foucault: Reva Siegel's ReasoningFrom the Body:
A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal
273
Protection.
269. Id. at 1481-82.
270. Id. at 1478.
271. Nor do I think it would surprise Thomas, who is aware of the tension between Foucault's
analytics of power and the state action doctrine. See texts accompanying notes 258-260, 267 supra.
272. As Joseph Singer summarizes the Realist strategy for exposing power behind the market:
By
"The realists argued that the state is fundamentally implicated in all 'private' transactions ....
defining the rules of the market, the state determines the distribution of economic power and thus the
distribution of wealth and income .... In the midst of every transaction sits the state, determining the
relative bargaining power of the parties, and hence, to a large extent, the structure of'private' relations."
Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REv. 465, 495 (1988).
The classic Realist sources in this vein are Morris R. Cohen, Propertyand Sovereignty, 13 CoRNELL L.Q. 8, 11, 12 (1927) (describing Lochner-style decisions as "the passing of a certain domain of
sovereignty from the state to the private employer of labor" and characterizing property right as "sovereign power compelling service and obedience"); Robert L. Hale, Bargainingand Economic Liberty, 43
COLtJM. L. Rnv. 603, 604 (1943) ("The owner... can insist on other people keeping their hands off his
products. Should he so insist, the government will back him up with force."); Robert L. Hale, Coercion
and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. Sci. Q. 470, 471 (1923) (describing
enforcement of property right as government "forcing the non-owner to desist from handling [the thing
owned], unless the owner consents"); Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About
Freedom of Contract,43 COLUM. L. Rv. 629, 641, 640 (1943) (describing contract law as "delegat[ing]
to individual citizens a piece of sovereignty which enables them to participate constantly in the law
making process," but noting that under modem conditions freedom of contract means "the exercise of
power by contract').
273. Reva Siegel, Reasoningfrom the Body: A HistoricalPerspective on Abortion Regulation and
Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REv. 261 (1992).
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Siegel's topic-the regulation of abortion-links nicely to Foucault's notion of "bio-power." Regulation of abortion involves the regulation of women's bodies, the exercise of "power over life," with a view toward global
issues of "population."2 74 Siegel traces the nineteenth century campaign to
criminalize abortion to the power of the medical profession and its asserted
knowledge of the scientific facts of reproduction z275 The arguments made on
behalf of abortion restrictions, however, were not purely scientific, but rested in
significant part on judgments about women's proper role-a polemic that was
in self-conscious opposition to early feminist demands for reform of the marriage relation.2 76 Siegel discusses the peculiar hybrid of discourses the doctors
accomplished, using the concept of "physiological sin" to condemn abortion in
terms at once religious and scientific.2 77 She describes, further, the doctors'
use of "populationist" notions to argue both that the nation's future depended
upon a strong birth rate generally and that abortion among native-born Americans was responsible for "dangerously" rising percentages of immigrant and
underclass children.2 78 These arguments, Siegel contends, are related genealogically to a continuing "physiological naturalism 2 79 in judicial reasoning
about issues of gender and reproduction: While explicit judgments about women's proper role are no longer persuasive, judgments coded in the language of
2 80
physiological difference may produce the same effect.
Thus, without expressly invoking Foucault, Siegel manages to touch on
many of his concerns: bio-power and the regulation of bodies for "populationist" purposes; the use of asserted scientific knowledge to exercise social power;
the particular power of the medical profession; the "tactical polyvalnce" of discourses, both moral and scientific; and the tension between discourses of power
and those of resistance. Like Foucault's work, Siegel's article is historical, but
not antiquarian. Siegel brackets her historical account at both ends by discuss28 1
ing the contemporary issue that motivates her inquiry.
This interpretation of Siegel's article suggests a strategy for appropriating
Foucault's insights. Foucault offers, first and foremost, a way of elaborating
the social and historical setting in which legal structures and communications
operate. His account of the "network" or "dense web"2 82 of social relations
emphasizes the importance of knowledge, particularly expert knowledge, in the
process of constituting, reproducing, contesting, and transforming relations of
power. Foucault's polemical dismissals notwithstanding, law is both product
and producer of this ceaseless process. Law, no less than the discursive prac274. See text accompanying notes 86-98 supra (describing Foucault's notions of bio-power and
"population"); Siegel, supranote 273, at 296-97 (discussing the power of doctors over women's "reproductive conduct").
275. Siegel, supra note 273, at 287-92.

276. Id. at 300-14.
277. Id. at 293-97.
278. Id. at 297-300; cf 1 FoucAuLT, TiH HisroRy oF SExuArtrry, supra note 16, at 148-50 (discussing eugenic projects in the 19th and 20th centuries).
279. See Siegel, supra note 273, at 267-68 (defining "physiological naturalism").
280. See id. at 267-80, 323-47.
281. See id. at 262-80, 347-81.
282. 1 FoucAuLT, THE HisToRY oF SExuALrry, supra note 16, at 96.
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tices Foucault analyzed in detail, provides resources both for the exercise of
power and for resistance to power.
Understanding law in this way requires close attention not just to the content of legal communications, but also to their rhetorical tactics. It requires,
also, examining law's relation to other social discourses-not just professional
discourses, such as Foucault's favorite examples of psychiatry, medicine, and
criminology, but perhaps also more general social discourses related to divisions such as race, class, gender, and sexual orientation. 28 3 Seen in this way,
Foucault's work suggests connections between legal scholarship and "cultural
284
studies" approaches.
As I suggested above, Foucault is less directly useful for the "normative"
aims of legal scholarship. Foucault paid little attention to legal questions, and
his descriptive, analytic approach seems in tension with prescriptive or normative forms of legal discourse. The deeper problem is that while Foucault's genealogies doubtless had a critical edge, Foucault never made clear his criteria of
evaluation. Understood as social criticism, Foucault's work seems to remain
parasitic on a normative theory, or at least a set of normative views, that he
never made explicit.285 That is, while Foucault emphasized the productivity
and ubiquity of power, refusing to posit a free, fully constituted subject liberated from power, his genealogies gain their critical edge from the sense that
domination and subjugation are worth opposing. 28 6 Foucault's tendency to invert the traditional Enlightenment story of progressively greater freedom and
autonomy-a tendency visible in his account of the rise of "disciplinary" or
"carceral" society2 7-seems still to trade on Enlightenment ideals, even in the
genealogical gesture of mocking them. 288
283. Siegel's article is a particularly good example of this technique. Her account of the nineteenth-century campaign to criminalize abortion describes both the attempt to make medicine speak
directly to law and the connections between medical discourse and popular discourse concerning norms
of gender, ethnicity, race and class. See Siegel, supra note 273, at 292 (noting tension between antiabortion doctors' presentation of 'Tacts" of childrearing and prevailing gender discourse), 293-97
(describing doctors' synthesis of scientific and religious argument), 297-300 (tracing doctors' appeal to
concerns of race, ethnicity and class), 300-04 (discussing doctors' argument that abortion is a crime
against maternity), 304-08 (noting 19th century feminist demands for "voluntary motherhood" and attri-

butions of abortion to conditions of sexual inequality), 308-11 (analyzing doctors' appropriation of
feminist terms and metaphors in context of antifeminist polemic), 314-18 (describing legislative acceptance of doctors' arguments, including arguments based on concerns of gender, ethnicity and class).
Siegel uses similar techniques in her account of "contemporary modes of reasoning about reproductive
regulation." Id. at 324; see also id. at 324-31 (describing physiological reasoning in popular antiabor-

tion arguments), 331-35 (noting physiological reasoning in judicial opinions concerning abortion, in-

cluding Roe v. Wade), 335-47 (describing gender bias in fetal-protective regulation and noting apparent
effects of gender, race and class on regulatory strategy).
284. See e.g., Susan S. Silbey, Making a Placefor CulturalAnalysis of Law, 17 LAW AND Soc.

INQUIRY 39, 41-48 (1992).
285. NANcY FRASER, UNRULY PRACrICES: POWER, DiscoURsE AND GENDER IN CONrTNORARY
CRITCAL TnEoRY 50-51 (1989); JORGEN IABER"Ms, THE Prm.osoPmcAL DiscotmsE OF MODERNrrY
282-86 (Frederick Lawrence trans., 1987) (describing Foucault's approach as "cryptonormativism").
286. See, e.g., FRASER, supra note 285, at 28; HABaR.As, supra note 285, at 283-84.
287. See text accompanying notes 82-85 supra.

288. Cf Thomas McCarthy, The Critiqueof Impure Reason: Foucaultand the FrankfurtSchool,
AND POWER: REcASTiNO THE FOuCAULT/HABERMAS DEBATE 243, 260 (Michael Kelly ed.,

in CRrTQUE
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My point here is not that Foucault is necessarily trapped in a fatal performafive contradiction, or that he owes us some fully developed (humanistic) theory
that explains which forms of power are worth resisting and which are not. My
point, rather, is simply that to the extent legal scholars engage in "normative
legal thought," 28 9 advocating some legal rule or outcome as appropriate or desirable, Foucault's work cannot be their only theoretical resource. To argue,
for example, that violence against gays and lesbians amounts to unconstitutional "cruel and unusual punishment" requires an account of the meaning of
this constitutional phrase. 2 90 To argue that restrictions on abortion violate the
requires an interpretation of what constitutional
Equal Protection 29Clause
"equality" means. 1
While Foucault of course does not speak directly to such issues, an encounter with his work nonetheless may be productive. For example, Siegel's constitutional argument against abortion-restrictive legislation draws from her
genealogy of the state's interest in "potential life." Her account of the ancestry
and development of "potential life" suggests that abortion-restrictive legislation
rests upon constitutionally impermissible judgements about women's proper
roles. 2 92 And Thomas uses Foucault's work to characterize violence against
gays and lesbians as an exercise of power, relativizing the distinction between
action taken by government officials ("state action" narrowly construed) and
action encouraged or permitted by the state ("state action" understood in a
"functional" rather than "formal" sense). 293 Thus, while Foucault's work may

be in tension with the normative aims of legal scholarship, strategic appropriation of his work may exploit this tension productively.
To be sure, appropriating Foucault requires revision of some aspects of his
work. The most obvious candidate for revision is Foucault's notion of law as
sovereign command. The next most obvious candidate, in my view, is Foucault's occasional suggestion that modem society is a "disciplinary" or
"carceral" society, a dystopian nightmare. Further, some of Foucault's fundamental substantive concepts-such as disciplinary power and biopowerspeak more directly to some areas of law than to others.
Still, as Hunt and Wickham observe, the point is not to construct a "Foucaultian theory of law," but rather to appropriate from Foucault what is useful.

1994) (noting that "it became clear to [Foucault] only in the 1980's that his form of critique also belongs
to... the 'semantic field' of Enlightenment discourse").
289. See Pierre Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of Form, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 801, 801-43
(1991) (describing the characteristics of "normative legal thought").

290. See Thomas, supra note 256, at 1487 (describing a 'unctional" interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment).
291. See Siegel, supra note 273, at 351-54 (distinguishing between "antidiscrimination" and "antisubordination" values of the constitutional equality guarantee).

292. See id. at 347-81.
293. See Thomas, supra note 256, at 1476-92.
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